Comments: The Credit Card Act of 2009 Was Not Enough: A National Usury Rate Would Provide Consumers with the Protection They Need by Schaefer, Eliot C.
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 41
Issue 4 Summer 2012 Article 5
2012
Comments: The Credit Card Act of 2009 Was Not
Enough: A National Usury Rate Would Provide
Consumers with the Protection They Need
Eliot C. Schaefer
University of Baltimore School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Consumer Protection Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Schaefer, Eliot C. (2012) "Comments: The Credit Card Act of 2009 Was Not Enough: A National Usury Rate Would Provide
Consumers with the Protection They Need," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 41: Iss. 4, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol41/iss4/5
THE CREDIT CARD ACT OF 2009 WAS NOT ENOUGH: A 
NATIONAL USURY RATE WOULD PROVIDE CONSUMERS 
WITH THE PROTECTION THEY NEED. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ruth Owens, a holder of a credit card with a $1,900 limit issued 
by Discover, had a balance of $1,460.73 in January of 1996. 1 Ms. 
Owens did not use her card in the previous month but did incur 
monthly charges. 2 These charges included a fee for a product called 
CreditSafe Plus, which was supposed to put payment and fmance 
charges on hold should Ms. Owens become disabled, hospitalized, or 
unemployed; Ms. Owens was on Social Security Disability and was 
unemployed when the card was issued. 3 Between January 1996 and 
February 1997, Ms. Owens did not make any purchases on the card 
and always made a payment towards her balance-although some 
payments were made late, which resulted in fees. 4 In February, 1997, 
Ms. Owens made her fIrst transaction on the card in over a year-and-
a-half with a $300 cash advance; at the end of the month the balance 
stood at $1,895.53.5 
In May 1997, Ms. Owens made another payment, but because it 
was under the minimum amount due, she incurred a late fee that 
increased her balance to $1,962.82.6 After making only one charge 
for $300 over the course of one year while making payments toward 
the balance, Ms. Owens' accrual of monthly charges and fees pushed 
her over her credit limit resulting in an additional charge. 7 Over the 
l. See Discover Bank v. Owens, 822 N.E.2d 869,871 (Ohio Misc. 2004). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 871-72. Apparently, the only time the credit protection product would provide 
any benefit was if Ms. Owens were to become hospitalized. Id. The product was of 
little benefit to Ms. Owens, but she was still sold the product and incurred a monthly 
fee for it. Id. at 872. 
4. Id. at 872. In 2005, the average late payment fee was $33.64. See U.S. GOV'T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-929, CREDIT CARDS: INCREASED COMPLEXITY IN 
RATES AND FEES HEIGHTENS NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES TO CONSUMERS 
18 (2006) [hereinafter GAO REpORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d06929.pdf. 
5. See Owens, 822 N.E.2d at 872. 
6. Id. Paying less than the minimum balance on a credit card debt can result in a late fee. 
Id. 
7. Id. 
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next six years, Ms. Owens did not use the card and continued to make 
payments toward her balance; but, because of charges and fees, the 
balance never fell below her limit of $1,900.8 Over that six-year 
period, Ms. Owens made payments totaling $3,492.9 One would 
assume those payments would be enough to satisfy the debt, 
considering that if the same payment were made on a $2,000 loan at a 
21 % annual percentage rate (APR), the debt would have been paid 
off 10 However, when the credit card company filed a collection suit 
in May 2003, the company claimed Ms. Owens owed $5,564.28. 11 
The case of Ruth Owens is just one example of a consumer not 
using a credit card recklessly but nevertheless having fees and 
fmance charges inflict fmancial ruin. 12 
Since the 1970s, consumers have become increasingly saddled 
with debt, which has led to an increase in bankruptcy filings. 13 
During this same period, credit card issuers "began to introduce cards 
with a greater variety of interest rates and fees" while making card 
agreements more complex. 14 This combination led to an increase in 
the cost for a consumer to obtain credit, often unbeknownst to the 
consumer. 15 The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and 
Disclosure Act of 2009 (Credit CARD Act), signed into law on May 
22, 2009,16 ''was developed to implement needed reforms and help 
protect consumers by prohibiting various unfair, misleading and 
deceptive practices in the credit card market."I? The reform was 
needed because situations similar to that of Ms. Owens were 
becoming common. 18 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION, PREEMPTION, AND 
INDUSTRY ABUSES § 11.8.2.2, at 734 (4th ed. 2009) [hereinafter COST OF CREDIT]. 
11. Owens, 822 N.E.2d at 872. 
12. See, e.g., In re McCarthy, No. 04-10493-SSM, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2584, at *1--6 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. July 14, 2004) (discussing a credit card consumer whom made 
$218.16 in purchases and made $3,058 in payments over a two-year period but saw 
the account balance increase from $4,888 to $5,357). 
13. See infra Part mB. 
14. S. REp. No. 111-16, at 3 (2009). 
15. See id. at 4. 
16. Credit Card Accountability and Disclosure Act of2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 
1734 [hereinafter Credit CARD Act] (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
17. S.REp.No.111-16,at2. 
18. See generally Donna S. Harkness, When Over-the-Limit Is over the Top: Addressing 
the Adverse Impact of Unconscionable Consumer-Credit Practices on the Elderly, 16 
ELDER L.J. 1, 2-4 (2008) (recounting the case of an elderly client who was 
represented by a student attorney while enrolled in the Elderly Law Clinic at the 
University of Memphis). 
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While the Credit CARD Act implemented some much needed 
regulation to alleviate the consumer debt burden, it did not go far 
enough. Credit card issuers are still able to exploit consumers' 
behavioral biases, thereby obscuring the cost of credit; 19 therefore, to 
effectuate the Act's intended purpose, a national usuryO rate needs to 
be implemented. This comment argues that a floating national usury 
rate tied to the prime rate that would cap the interest rate that credit 
card issuers can charge consumers is necessary to carry out the Act's 
policy. 
In the early years of credit card transactions, consumers were 
protected by state usury laws.21 But the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the National Bank Ace2 in Marquette National Bank 
of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Service Corp.23 essentially preempted 
a state's power to enforce state usury laws against credit card issuers 
and deregulated the credit card market.24 This decision, explored 
further in Part II/5 is one of the reasons federal legislation, as 
opposed to state legislation, is needed to curtail many practices26 
employed by credit card issuers. 
Part II of this comment explores the early history of credit cards 
and how the credit card marketplace has evolved in this country.27 
That part also discusses two Supreme Court decisions28 that have 
enabled credit card companies to essentially avoid regulation on the 
interest and fees that can be charged to consumers. 29 
19. See infra Part m.e. 
20. Usury is defmed by Black's Law Dictionary as "the charging of an illegal rate of 
interest as a condition to lending money" and "[a]n illegally high rate of interest." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1685 (9th ed. 2009). "Usury laws are among the oldest 
form of economic and financial regulation." Steven Mercatante, The Deregulation of 
Usury Ceilings, Rise of Easy Credit, and Increasing Consumer Debt, 53 S.D. L. REv. 
37, 39 (2008). Essentially, usury laws place a legal limit on the maximum allowable 
interest a lender can charge, if any at all. See Brian M. McCall, Unprofitable 
Lending: Modern Credit Regulation and the Lost Theory of Usury, 30 CARDOZO L. 
REv. 549, 554-58 (2008). 
21. Mark Furletti, Comment, The Debate over the National Bank Act and the Preemption 
of State Efforts to Regulate Credit Cards, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 425, 430-31 (2004). 
22. National Bank Act, 12 U.S.e. §§ 21-216d. (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
23. Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Servo Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 307-
15 (1978). 
24. See id. at 313,318-19. 
25. See infra Part II.B.l. 
26. See infra Part m.A. 
27. See infra Part II. 
28. See Smiley V. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996); Marquette, 439 U.S. 299. 
29. See infra Part II.B.1-2. 
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Part III takes a look at the Credit CARD Act and the benefits it 
will provide consumers. 30 It then looks at the massive debt problem 
American society is currently facing. 3l Part III then delves into 
consumers' seemingly irrational behaviors when it comes to credit 
cards and how that behavior has been exploited by credit card 
issuers. 32 
Part IV explores legislative options that can be undertaken to help 
alleviate the consumer debt situation. 33 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CREDIT CARD CULTURE IN 
AMERICA 
The relative abundance of credit cards in the marketplace is a 
fairly recent development.34 At the tum of the twentieth century, 
large scale department stores, such as Sears & Roebuck, introduced 
the concept of "credit cards. ,,35 Early cards allowed consumers to 
make purchases at the issuing store on credit; however, because most 
merchants demanded consumers payoff the cards by the end of the 
month, early "credit cards" were not a product that the masses had 
the ability to use.36 
The modem credit card (i.e., a non-retail specific card issued by a 
third-party) was developed in the middle of the twentieth century. 37 
The "Diner's Club Card," first issued in 1949, was the first card of its 
kind, a card that granted consumers ''universal purchasing power 
offered by a third party.,,38 With the introduction of the Diner's Club 
Card, credit cards were no longer retailer specific and consumers had 
greater purchasing ability.39 Because of the success of the Diner's 
Club Card, other companies, such as American Express, entered the 
credit card market.40 However, like the earlier retailer specific credit 
30. See infra Part I1I.A. 
31. See infra Part III.B. 
32. See infra Part me. 
33. See infra Part IV. 
34. Kathleen M. Moore, The Pending Credit Card Debt Meltdown: What's Happening in 
Your Wallet?, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 420,421 (2009). 
35. Mercatante, supra note 20, at 39-40. 
36. Id. Early credit cards did not offer revolving debt. Id at 40. Consumers still needed 
sufficient funds to pay off the entire debt on a monthly basis. Id. 
37. Christopher L. Peterson, Truth. Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit: The 
Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REv. 807, 865 (2003). 
38. Mercatante, supra note 20, at 40. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
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cards, the balance of these cards had to be paid at the end of each 
month.41 
In the late 1960s, the credit card industry experienced a boom with 
the advent of the Visa and MasterCard systems. 42 While Visa and 
MasterCard did not issue credit cards (or credit) to consumers, they 
organized networks of bank-issuers and entered into merchant 
agreements to facilitate credit card transactions. 43 The network of 
bank-issuers issued credit to consumers, and Visa and MasterCard 
handled the management and operation of the payment and card 
systems.44 The merchant agreements were made so that a national 
entity, as opposed to a regional or local bank-issuer, was backing the 
card transaction. 45 By forming networks of bank-issuers and 
merchants, Visa and MasterCard provided consumers a card that 
could truly be used nationally.46 
A. Development of Usury Laws 
Throughout history, usury laws have had a presence in economic 
and fmancial regulation.47 Limits on interest rates can be traced back 
as early as 2000 B.C. to a Mesopotamian kingdom.48 Greeks and 
Romans denounced the practice of usury and implemented laws 
41. Oren Bar-GIll, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1373,1382 (2004). 
42. Jd. 
43. See Christopher C. DeMuth, The Case Against Credit Card Interest Rate Regulation, 
3 YALE J. ON REG. 201,207 (1986). 
44. Id. Visa and MasterCard are known as "card associations." See GAO REpORT, supra 
note 4, at 73. When a consumer makes a purchase, the transaction is transmitted by 
the merchant to the card association. Id. The card association forwards the merchant 
request to the card issuer, who then clears the transaction. Id. The card association 
then pays the merchant after taking a fee from both the card issuer and merchant. Id. 
45. Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Economic Cost of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 
55 UCLA L. REv. 1321, 1367 (2008). When the credit card market was in its infancy 
during the 1960s, many merchants were reluctant to take credit cards issued by banks 
outside of their state. Id. During this period, there were no banks with a national 
presence. Id. The formation of the Visa and MasterCard associations guaranteed 
credit cards would be accepted by their member merchants and gave cards the ability 
to be used nationally. Id. at 1367-68. 
46. Jd. Visa and MasterCard supply settlement, authorization, and other services to their 
bank-members and settle over a billion transactions annually. DeMuth, supra note 43, 
at 207. 
47. Paul G. Hayeck, An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Usury Laws, 15 ANN. 
REv. BANKING L. 253, 255 (1996). A purpose of usury laws is the protection of the 
borrower. COST OF CREDIT, supra note 10, at 3. Lenders and borrowers are often not 
on equal footing and the lenders' terms are often offered on a "take it or leave it" 
basis. See id. 
48. Hayeck, supra note 47, at 255. 
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against it. 49 Because of this historical foundation, early English 
common law prohibited the charging of interest. 50 
During the founding of America, the English settlers brought the 
English common law, and, therefore, the concept of usury, to the 
American colonies. 51 Prior to America's independence, many 
colonies adopted usury statutes. 52 Massachusetts, in 1661, was the 
first colony to enact a usury statute and other colonies soon followed 
suit. 53 In many states, variations of these original usury laws are still 
in place today. 54 
In the twentieth century, when the credit card marketplace began 
to develop, these state usury laws governed credit card transactions. 55 
Because each state enacted usury laws that were specific to its state 
and citizens, credit card issuers were faced with the challenge of 
dealing with an assortment of regulations. 56 Credit card issuers 
contended that having to deal with varied state regulations increased 
the costs of doing business. 57 
The lack of uniformity in state laws led to citizens of different 
states being treated differently with regard to credit products.58 For 
example, American Express would need a different contract with 
different terms, and would have to charge a different interest rate for 
extending credit to a citizen of State A than it would for extending 
credit to a citizen of State B. Credit card issuers alleged that this 
problem led to an inefficient business model that was costly and not 
easily managed or operated. 59 
Faced with strict usury laws in each state, credit card companies 
turned to the federal courts for relie£60 Two Supreme Court cases61 
49. Mercatante, supra note 20, at 39. 
50. Hayeck, supra note 47, at 255. 
51. Mercatante, supra note 20, at 39. 
52. See COST OF CREDIT, supra note 10, § 2.2.2, at 17. 
53. Hayeck, supra note 47, at 256. 
54. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-102 (LEXISNEXIS 2005) (specifying the 
maximum interest rate to be six percent). See also COST OF CREDIT, supra note 10, 
§ 2.2.2, at 17. 
55. Bar-Gill, supra note 41, at 1381-82. 
56. Mercatante, supra note 20, at 39--40. 
57. Jd. at 40-41. 
58. See id. at 40. 
59. Bar-Gill, supra note 41, at 1381, 1381 n.27. 
60. See, e.g., Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Servo Corp., 439 U.S. 
299 (1978). 
61. See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996); Marquette, 439 U.S. 
299 (1978). 
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played a major role in deregulating usury laws and have enabled 
credit card issuers to reap tremendous profits. 62 
B. The Supreme Court's Role in "Deregulating" the Credit Card 
Industry 
With the way the National Bank Act (NBA)63 was drafted, credit 
card issuers saw an opportunity that would allow them to operate a 
more homogenous business practice and circumvent state usury 
laws.64 
1. Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Service 
Corp. 
In Marquette, First Omaha National Bank (Omaha Bank), a 
national banking association65 with its charter address in Omaha, 
Nebraska, regularly solicited customers and issued credit cards to 
consumers in Minnesota as well as in its home state. 66 The two states 
had different usury limits; Minnesota allowed a maximum interest 
rate of 12%, while Nebraska allowed a maximum rate of 18%.67 
Omaha Bank charged its Minnesota customers the 18% rate allowed 
in Nebraska, the state in which it was chartered.68 
Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis (Marquette) brought suit 
to enjoin Omaha Bank from soliciting business in Minnesota until it 
complied with Minnesota law. 69 Omaha Bank argued that because it 
62. See CONSUMERS UNION, CREDIT CARD FACTS AND STATS 1 (2009) (stating that, in 
2006, credit card issuers collected $115 billion in revenue and made $18 billion in 
profits). 
63. National Bank Act, 12 U.S.c. §§ 21-216d (2006 & Supp. N 2011). The NBA 
established "a federally chartered banking system" that created a federal banking 
system separate from and independent of state control. Furletti, supra note 21, at 427. 
The purpose of the NBA was to stabilize the economy during and after the Civil War. 
Id. The NBA allowed banks to establish a federal charter to avoid hostile state 
interference. Id. 
64. See infra Part II.B.l.a. 
65. A national bank is a bank chartered under federal laws as opposed to state laws. See 
Furietti, supra note 21, at 427. 
66. Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Servo Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 301-
02 (1978). 
67. Id. at 302. 
68. See id. at 302-04. 
69. Id. at 304. Marquette brought the suit because, to make up the profits it was "losing" 
to Omaha Bank, Marquette was forced to charge an annual fee. Id. People are more 
apt to choose a card with no annual fee and a higher rate rather than a card with any 
annual fee and a lower interest rate. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making 
Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1,35-36 (2008). 
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was a national bank, it was governed by federal law and, thus, the 
NBA.70 The NBA stated that a national bank may charge "interest at 
the rate allowed by the laws of the State... where the bank is 
10cated.,,71 
The issue in the case was the meaning of the term "located."n 
Omaha Bank argued that because it was chartered in Nebraska, it was 
"located" there for the purpose of the NBA.73 Marquette, on the other 
hand, argued that because Omaha Bank continuously and 
systematically solicited credit card business in the state of Minnesota, 
Omaha Bank was "located" in Minnesota for the purpose of that 
particular credit card program.74 The Court held that a national bank 
is "located" in the state identified on its organization certificate (i.e., 
the location of the bank's headquarters).75 If the term were construed 
as Marquette contended, "the term 'located' would be so stretched as 
to throw into confusion the complex system of modem interstate 
banking.,,76 
The Court's decision allowed national banks to "export" the 
interest rate of the state in which it is chartered to citizens of another 
state.77 The Court viewed the exporting of credit card interest rates in 
the same vein as a citizen of one state crossing state lines to obtain a 
loan in another state.78 
With the Court's interpretation of the term "located," the NBA 
"effectively preempted the interest rate regulations of the forty-nine 
states in which a card issuer could not actually be organized.,,79 
a. The effect of the Marquette decision 
With the Court ruling that credit card issuers could export the 
interest rates from their charter state to citizens of foreign states, the 
Marquette decision limited what states could do to protect their own 
70. Id. at 308. 
71. 12 U.S.c. § 85 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
72. Marquette Nat'! Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Servo Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 308 
( 1978). 
73. See id. at 308. 
74. See id. at 309-10. 
75. Id. at 310. 
76. Id. at 312. The Court stated that the "minimum contacts" argument could cause 
difficulties for national banks as to whether contacts with citizens of foreign states 
would be sufficient to alter the meaning of the term "located." Id. 
77. Id. at, 318. 
78. Id. However, because of mail and modern technology, the ability to obtain credit 
from another state is substantially easier than in the past. Id. at 318-19. 
79. Furletti, supra note 21, at 431-32. 
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citizens from usurious interest rates. 80 States with no usury laws or 
with laws allowing high interest rates became prime locations for the 
headquarters of credit card issuers.81 Within six years of the 
Marquette decision, eighteen states relaxed their usury laws and 
another sixteen repealed usury laws altogether.82 Post Marquette, 
credit card issuers moved their operations to states with liberal or no 
usury laws and began to market cards nationally.83 Because credit 
card issuers were able to export the rates of the state in which they 
were chartered, the "Marquette decision produced a functionally 
deregulated credit card market.,,84 
2. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. 
In 1996, the Supreme Court issued another ruling that allowed 
credit card issuers "to increase their income stream even more 
dramatically. ,,85 Despite the ruling in Marquette that allowed credit 
card issuers to export the interest rates of their charter states, the 
foreign states seemingly still had the ability to control the fees that 
credit card issuers charged to consumers within their states.86 In 
Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.,87 a credit card issuer's 
ability to export fees was challenged.88 
In Smiley, a resident of California had two credit cards that were 
issued by Citibank, a national bank located in South Dakota.89 The 
credit card agreements allowed Citibank to charge for certain late 
fees that were permissible by South Dakota law but violated 
California law. 90 After being charged a late fee, Smiley brought suit, 
alleging the fee violated California state law and was 
''unconscionable. ,,91 
80. Bar-Gill, supra note 41, at 1382. 
81. Vincent D. Rougeau, Rediscovering Usury: An Argument for Legal Controls on 
Credit Card Interest Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 10 (1996). 
82. See DeMuth, supra note 43, at 213. 
83. Rougeau, supra note 81, at 10. Citibank, a national bank that was headquartered in 
New York, relocated its operation to South Dakota where there were no usury laws. 
DeMuth, supra note 43, at 215-16. 
84. Bar-Gill, supra note 41, at 1382. 
85. COST OF CREDIT, supra note 10, § 11.8.2.4, at 736. 
86. See Alan S. Kaplinsky, Federal Usury Law Developments, 101 BANKING L.J. 663, 
669-70 (1984). 
87. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996). 
88. Id. at 737. 
89. Id. at 737-38. 
90. Id. at 738. 
91. Id. 
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In analyzing whether the charging of the fee was permissible, the 
Court deferred to the affice of the Comptroller of Currency's (acct2 defmition of "interest.,,93 The acc stated: 
The term "interest" as used in 12 U.S.C. 85 includes any 
payment compensating a creditor or prospective creditor for 
an extension of credit, making available of a line of credit, 
or any default or breach by a borrower of a condition upon 
which credit was extended. It includes, among other things, 
the following fees connected with credit extension or 
availability: numerical periodic rates, late fees, not sufficient 
funds (NSF) fees, overlimit fees, annual fees, cash advance 
fees, and membership fees. It does not ordinarily include 
appraisal fees, premiums and commissions attributable to 
insurance guaranteeing repayment of any extension of 
credit, fmders' fees, fees for document preparation or 
notarization, or fees incurred to obtain credit reports.94 
In deferring to the acc' s defmition, which encompassed a wide 
variety of fees, the Court looked only at whether the acc's 
defmition of "interest" was reasonable, not whether the interpretation 
represented the best possible interpretation. 95 The Court held that 
because the acc's interpretation was not unreasonable, the fees 
stipulated in the defmition were "interest" and could be exported. 96 
a. The effect of the Smiley decision 
Under the Court's holding in Smiley, national banks have been 
able to export fees permitted by their charter states so long as the fees 
are considered "interest" under the acc's definition. 97 The acc's 
definition of "interest" includes many fees, "such as late payment, 
over-limit, cash advance, returned check, annual fees, and 
membership fees. ,,98 Like Marquette, Smiley eradicated a state's 
ability to protect its citizens from charges a credit card issuer can 
92. The acc is the agency granted power to regulate national banks. See 12 U.S.c. § 1 
(2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
93. Smiley, 517 U.S. at 739-40. 
94. 61 Fed. Reg. 4849, 4869 (Feb. 9,1996) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.400 I (a) (2012)). 
95. Smiley, 517 U.S. at 740, 744-45. 
96. Jd. at 746-47. 
97. See Karen Mower, Note & Comment, Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.: 
Banks Find "Interest" in Credit Card Late Payment Fees, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 169, 
187 (1997). 
98. COST OF CREDIT, supra note 10, § 11.8.2.4, at 736. 
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impose.99 Credit card issuers have reaped huge rewards at the 
expense of consumers because of this decision. 100 Penalty fee 
revenue for issuers has increased from $1.7 billion in 1996 to $18 
billion in 2007-a nine-fold increase since Smiley was decided. 101 
III. THE CURRENT CREDIT SITUATION AND THE IMPACT 
OF THE CREDIT CARD ACT 
As credit cards have become more ubiquitous with minimal 
regulation,102 consumers' irrational behavioral tendencies have been 
exploited by credit card issuers, thereby contributing to the massive 
consumer debt. l03 Credit card issuers have engaged in deceptive and 
unfair practices 104 that have led to the consumer debt steadily trending 
upwards since the Marquette decision. 105 As outstanding consumer 
debt has mounted, bankruptcy filings have increased. 106 And while 
consumers have been amassing debt in unprecedented amounts, 107 
credit card companies are experiencing record profits. l08 The Credit 
CARD Act was enacted to protect consumers and address the vast 
consumer debt the American society is faced with. 109 
A. The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure 
Act 0/2009 
The Credit CARD Act was passed to "implement needed reforms 
and help protect consumers by prohibiting various unfair, misleading 
99. Mower, supra note 97, at 188-89. 
100. See COST OF CREDIT, supra note 10, § 11.8.4.1, at 742. 
101. Id. After Smiley, credit card issuers grew their fee revenue by "making fees higher in 
amount, imposing them more quickly, and assessing them more often." Id. 
102. See supra Part II.B. 
103. See supra Part m.B-c. 
104. See Reforming the Practices of Credit Card Companies and Providing New 
Protections for Consumers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & 
Urban Affairs, lllth Congo 19-20 (2009) (statement of Travis Plunkett, Legislative 
Director, Consumer Federation of America). 
105. G-I9 Release: Consumer Credit Outstanding, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. REs. Svs., 
http://www.federaireserve.gov/releases/gI9/HIST/cc _ histJ.html (last updated May. 
7, 2012) [hereinafter Consumer Credit Outstanding] (providing monthly historical 
data of revolving consumer credit outstanding). 
106. GAO REpORT, supra note 4, app. II at 86-87. 
107. See Consumer Credit Outstanding, supra note 105. 
108. The Effect of Current Credit Card Industry Practices on Consumers: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 1 10th Congo (2007) (statement of 
Travis B. Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America, Consumer 
Action and Consumers Union). 
109. S. REp. No. 111-16, at 2-4 (2009). 
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and deceptive practices in the credit card market."llo Namely, the 
Credit CARD Act prohibits raising interest rates without any 
notice, III double-cycle billing,112 universal defaults,l13 charging a 
higher rate of interest to an outstanding balance,114 and raising rates 
within the one-year period after a card is issued to a consumer. 115 
Additionally, the Credit CARD Act stipulates that all fees and 
penalties a credit card issuer charges must be "reasonable and 
proportional" to the violation. 116 
The Credit CARD Act has been hailed as the "greatest set of 
federal legislative enactments in history directed specifically at credit 
cards and the credit card industry.,,117 The Act attempts to regulate 
the credit card industry through "substantive regulation of credit card 
terms and behavior, and regulation designed to improve disclosure to 
consumers.,,118 
1. Key Components of the Credit CARD Act 
a. Universal default and universal change in terms 
Prior to the Act, credit card issuers' agreements with consumers 
allowed terms, including those relating to interest rates and other 
fees, to be changed for no reason and with little notice to the user. 119 
Universal defaults allowed issuers to change card agreement terms 
because of circumstances wholly unrelated to the card. 120 Even if the 
cardholder had acted in accordance with the card agreement, issuers 
110. Jd. at 2. 
Ill. See Credit CARD Act, § 101 (a), 15 U.S.c. § 1637(i)(l) ("[A] creditor shall provide 
written notice of an increase in an annual percentage rate .. not later than 45 days 
prior to the effective date of the increase."). 
112. Id. § 102(a), 15 U.S.c. § 1637(j)(1) (prohibiting "double-cycle billing and penalties 
for on-time payments"). 
113. Id. § 101(b), IS U.S.c. § 1666i-l(a) ("[N]o creditor may increase any annual 
percentage rate, fee, or finance charge applicable to any outstanding balance, except 
as permitted by [the ACT]."). 
114. Jd. § 101 (b), IS U.S.c. § 1666i-l(c) ("[A] creditor shall not change the terms 
governing the repayment of any outstanding balance. "). 
liS. Id. § 101 (d), IS u.s.c. § 1666i-2(a) (prohibiting any increase in the "annual 
percentage rate, fee, or fmance charge . before the end of the I-year period 
beginning on the date on which the account is opened"). 
116. See id. § 1665d(a) ("[A]ny penalty fee or charge that a card issuer may impose .. 
[must] be reasonable and proportional to such omission or violation."). 
117. Joseph U. Schorer, The Credit Card Act of 2009: Credit Card Reform and the Uneasy 
Case for Disclosure, 127 BANKING LJ. 924, 925 (2010). 
118. !d. at 942. 
119. GAO REpORT, supra note 4, at 33-36. 
120. S.REp.No.lll-16,at4-5(2009). 
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were able to increase the interest rates or fees because of a late 
payment on another account-including accounts for car payments, 
mortgage payments, or other credit cards. 121 
In addition to universal default clauses, many credit card 
agreements included an "Any Time, Any Reason" clause where 
issuers could change the terms of the contract at any time for almost 
any reason. 122 A 2008 survey indicated that 77% of issuers reserved 
the right to increase a card holder's interest rate at any time and apply 
the new rate on subsequent purchases as well the pre-existing 
balance. 123 
While universal defaults and "Any Time, Any Reason" clauses are 
not completely barred by the Act, the Act does provide consumers 
with protection relating to these practices. l24 Credit card issuers must 
notify card holders forty-five days prior to any change, and issuers 
must "maintain reasonable methodologies for assessing" whether an 
interest rate should be increased. 125 The Act also prohibits issuers 
from imposing a higher interest rate on existing balances. 126 
Consumers benefit because they must receive explicit notice of 
rate increases forty-five days prior to any change that affects the 
card's price.127 Additionally, issuers cannot impose new, higher 
interest rates on balances from purchases that consumers have 
already made. 128 This allows consumers to rationally fmance 
purchases through credit cards, because their interest rates cannot 
increase unpredictably and increase the credit cost and the total cost 
of the purchase. 
h. Limits on interest rate increases 
The Act places other restrictions on interest rate increases. Rates 
on newly issued cards cannot be raised within the first year.129 
However, promotional rates are exempt from this provision and can 
121. See Jaclyn Rodriguez, The Credit CARD Act of 2009: An Effective but Incomplete 
Solution Evidencing the Needfor a Federal Regulator, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 309, 
314-15 (2010). 
122. S.REp.No.l11-16,at5. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Credit CARD Act, § 148, 123 Stat. 1734, 1737-38; Schorer, supra note 117, at 931-
32. 
126. Credit CARD Act § 171, 123 Stat. at 1736. 
127. See Schorer, supra note 117, at 931-32. 
128. See id. at 928-29. 
129. Credit CARD Act § 101(d). 
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be increased after six months. 130 Whenever rates are increased, the 
Act requires issuers to review the rate increase "to assess whether ... 
factors have changed" and to determine whether the interest rate 
should be reduced. 131 The Act states that issuers should consider "the 
credit risk of the obligor, market conditions, or other factors.,,132 No 
other guidance is given on what an issuer must do in its evaluation, 
how it should document its evaluation, or that the rate should be 
lowered if certain criteria are met. 133 
This portion of the Act was likely targeted at curbing many of the 
prescreened solicitations and "teaser rates" 134 that card issuers 
advertise.135 Card issuers would routinely send solicitations I 36_W ith 
low introductory rates and high ''up to" credit limits I 37_to consumers 
who likely could not qualify for or receive such a low rate or high 
credit limit (i.e., individuals with poor or no credit histories).138 
When the consumer actually applied, the credit limit on the card 
received was lower and the interest rate higher than the applicant 
expected. 139 And when the consumer received the card with terms 
that were much worse than expected, that consumer could not decline 
the card and start searching for a new card because multiple credit 
requests can lower the consumer's credit score. 140 A lower credit 
score means the consumer is less likely to get another card. 141 
130. Id. The Federal Reserve Board of Governors is tasked with defining "promotional 
rate." Id. 
131. Credit CARD Act, § 101(c), 123 Stat. 1734, 1737-38. 
132. Jd. 
133. The Act specifically states that "[t]his section shall not be construed to require a 
reduction in any specific amount." Id. § 148(c). 
134. Teaser or introductory rates are offers, typically unsolicited, of a low interest rate for 
an initial period of time. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 69, at 50-51. After the 
introductory period, the interest rate increases. Id. at 51. Consumers feel they will 
not need to borrow past or will switch cards after the introductory period ends. Id. 
More than a third of consumers pick a card for the teaser rate but often never switch 
once the rate increases. Id. 
135. See Schorer, supra note 117, at 932. 
136. See Mechele Dickerson, Vanishing Financial Freedom, 61 ALA. L. REv. 1079, 1102 
(2010). 
137. An "up to" credit limit is the card's maximum credit limit. OFFICE OF THE 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, ADVISORY LETTER 
2004-10, CREDIT CARD PRACTICES 2 (Sept. 14,2004). 
138. S. REp. No. 111-16, at 6 (2009). 
139. Id. 
140. Jd. 
141. Jd. 
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c. Fees and double-cycle billing 
Double-cycle billing was a practice employed by about one-third 
of card issuers that computed fmance charges on balances that had 
already been paid. 142 Under this practice, a consumer who paid only 
a portion of the outstanding credit balance when it was due would 
still be charged interest on the entire amount. 143 This practice 
increased a card holder's cost because interest was being charged and 
collected on portions of a balance that had already been paid. l44 This 
fee was hidden from consumers, and it was virtually impossible to 
determine that a balance was subject to double-cycle billing by 
simply looking at a statement. 145 With limited exceptions, this 
practice is now prohibited. l46 Consumers benefit because they can no 
longer be charged interest on a balance which they have paid. 
B. Increased Debt Load 
Over the last forty years, credit card use and the accumulation of 
consumer debt has increased rapidly. 147 Credit card agreements have 
become more complicated 148 and have higher, more complex fees. 149 
At the same time, credit cards have grown in popularity. ISO In 1970, 
only 16% of households had a credit card, while that number stands 
at nearly 75% today. 151 In December 1978, the year of the Marquette 
decision, outstanding consumer debt stood at $48 billion. 152 In May 
2009, when the Credit CARD Act was signed into law, outstanding 
consumer debt had risen to $910 billion. 153 
The growth in the use of credit cards has primarily been driven by 
two factors: convenience, cards acting as a substitute for cash and 
checks in transactions; and credit, cards acting as a substitute to other 
142. GAO REpORT, supra note 4, at 28. 
143. Schorer, supra note 117, at 932-33. 
144. See id. at 933. 
145. See S. REp. No. 111-16, at 7 (2009). 
146. See generally Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 102(a), 123 Stat. 1734 (2009) (exceptions include instances 
where there is an adjustment to a finance charge as a result of a dispute or because of 
a return of a payment for insufficient funds). 
147. See Consumer Credit Outstanding, supra note 105; Moore, supra note 34, at 241-42. 
148. GAO REpORT, supra note 4, at 6. 
149. Id. at 18. 
150. Id. at 1. 
151. S.REP.No.Ill-16,at3. 
152. Consumer Credit Outstanding, supra note 105. 
153. Id. Outstanding consumer debt peaked in December 2008 at $989 billion. Id. In 
November 2010, debt stood at $807 billion. Id. 
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short-term loans. 154 In 2007, the average household made monthly 
charges of $889 on credit cards. 155 Nearly half of all card holders 
carry some debt over from month to month. 156 
In the 1990s, after the Smiley decision, credit card issuers "began 
to introduce cards with a greater variety of interest rates and fees, and 
the amounts that cardholders can be charged have been growing." 157 
As card fees and rates became more complex, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) found the need for heightened 
regulation and more effective disclosures to consumers. 158 As credit 
card agreements, fees, and interest rates have gotten more complex, 
they have been a major factor in the increase in consumer debt. 159 As 
debt has steadily accumulated for consumers, bankruptcy filings have 
increased. 160 
In 1980, the year after the Marquette decision, 287,000 consumers 
filed for bankruptcy. 161 Twenty-five years later, more than two 
million consumers filed for bankruptcy. 162 While credit card usage 
cannot be solely responsible for the 600% increase in bankruptcy 
filings over the twenty-five year period, it has been a factor. 163 
154. Todd 1. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REv. 79,83 (2000). 
155. KEVIN FOSTER ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF Bos., No. 09-10, THE 2008 SURVEY OF 
CONSUMER PAYMENT CHOICE 7 (2008), available at http://www.bos.frb.orgleconomic/ 
ppdpI2009/ppdp0910.pdf. 
156. Brian K. Bucks et aI., Changes in Us. Family Finances from 2004 to 2007: Evidence 
from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 95 FED. REs. BULL. (February 2009). 
157. S. REp. No. III-16, at 3 (2009). 
158. See GAO REpORT, supra note 4, at 77-79. 
159. Id. at 1-7. 
160. See id. app. II. at 86-87; Consumer Credit Outstanding, supra note 105. 
161. GAO REpORT, supra note 4, at 56. 
162. Id. at 86. 
163. Id. at 56-57. 
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C. Behavioral Analysis of Credit Card Usage and How Consumers 
Are Impacted 64 
A former general counsel ofCitigroup once stated that "[nJo other 
industry in the world knows consumers and their transaction behavior 
better than the bank card industry. It has turned the analysis of 
consumers into a science rivaling the studies of DNA .... ,,165 The 
nature of the credit card agreement and the knowledge credit card 
issuers obtain regarding consumer behavior place issuers in a position 
where they are able to exploit consumers' irrational tendencies. 166 As 
highly sophisticated and well-capitalized companies, credit card 
issuers are in position to exploit consumers' behavioral biases with 
little resistance. 167 
By analyzing and utilizing virtually all consumer transaction 
data,168 credit card issuers are able to closely track consumer behavior 
and exploit irrational tendencies. 169 This exploitation of consumer 
behavior is a factor in the ever-increasing consumer debt burden. 170 
Because of minimal regulation and oversight of credit cards, issuers 
have been able to implement practices that hide the true cost of credit 
from consumers.l7l In a well-functioning market with rational 
164. The behavioral analysis discussed in this section is brief and intended to lay a basic 
foundation for a behavioral economic analysis of credit cards. For more detail on the 
behavioral economics, consult the following sources: Bar-Gill, supra note 41, at 
1395-1402; Susan Block-Lieb & Edward 1. Janger, The Myth of the Rational 
Borrower: Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Reform" of Bankruptcy 
Law, 84 TEX. L. REv. 1481 (2006); Christine lolls, Cass R Sunstein & Richard 
Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471 
(1998); Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and Preference 
Among Low-Income Consumers, 86 TEx. L. REv. 451 (2008); Maurice E. Stucke, 
Money, Is That What I Want?: Competition Policy and the Role of Behavioral 
Economics, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 893 (2010). 
165. Duncan A. McDonald, Viewpoint, Card Industry Questions Congress Needs to Ask, 
AM. BANKER, Mar. 23, 2007, at 10. 
166. See Peter A. Alces & Michael M. Greenfield, They Can Do What!? Limitations on 
the Use of Change-of-Terms Clauses, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1099, 1099-1106 (2010). 
Further, twelve credit card issuers control over 80% of the market. Id at 1129 & 
n.83. 
167. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 69, at 33. 
168. See id at 23-24. In May of 2003, there were approximately 2.3 billion credit and 
debit card transactions. GAO REpORT, supra note 4, at 14. 
169. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 69, at 23-24. 
170. See id 
171. Seeid. at 23-25. 
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consumers, regulation would not be needed. 172 However, credit card 
consumers display irrational behavior, which justifies additional 
regulation. 173 
1. Imperfect Self-Control 
Many consumers enter into credit card agreements with the 
intention not to overspend. 174 However, credit cards separate 
consumers from their money and minimize the "pain of paying.,,175 
Without the pain of spending, consumers lose touch with the money 
they are spending.176 A credit card separates the decision to obtain a 
credit card from the decision to spend on credit. 177 Because credit 
cards are open-ended loans, the only thing stopping consumers from 
exceeding their own pre-set spending limit is their own self-
control. 178 
When consumers enter into credit card agreements with the 
expectation that they will simply be convenience users and not 
revolve a debt, they do not pay much attention to interest rates. 179 
Consumers who do not plan to carry a balance look almost 
exclusively at card benefits and the annual fee charged rather than the 
interest rate and penalty fees. 18o Such incentives are designed to 
encourage consumers to increase their credit use. 181 
2. Hyperbolic Discounting 
The theory of hyperbolic discounting provides an answer to why a 
consumer would spend more than initially anticipated. 182 A 
hyperbolic discounter "discounts costs and benefits that will 
materialize in the near future,... but assigns only a smaller 
additional discount for costs (and benefits) that will materialize in the 
172. See Zwicki, supra note 154, at 11~29 (arguing that the credit card market is 
competitive, and thus well-functioning). 
173. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 69, at 1-8. 
174. Bar-Gill, supra note 41, at 1395. 
175. Credit Cards Often Sell Us on Spending, AM. PUB. RADIO (Feb. 3, 2009), 
http;llwww.marketp1ace.orgitopicslbusiness/credit-cards-often-sell-us-spending. 
176. See id. 
177. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 69, at 33-34. 
178. See Bar-Gill, supra note 41, at 1395. 
179. Zywicki, supra note 154, at 101. 
180. Id. at 101-02. 
181. See Dickerson, supra note 136, at 1103. 
182. Bar-Gill, supra note 41, at 1396. 
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more distant future. ,,183 Essentially, what this amounts to IS a 
"present-biased" preference. 184 
Individuals inordinately prefer immediate rewards over greater 
future rewards or consequences. 185 For instance, a hyperbolic 
discounter ''when offered the choice between $100 today and $110 
tomorrow ... will choose the $100 today because [the individual] 
discounts tomorrow's reward heavily compared to today's.,,186 With 
credit cards, individuals obtain cards with an intention to use the card 
only in particular circumstances-for necessities or emergencies, for 
example. 187 But when the time comes to use the credit card, 
individuals focus on their immediate gratification and spend rather 
than consider the future consequences. 188 
3. Imperfect Information 
Because consumers are in an unequal position compared to credit 
card issuers with respect to bargaining power and the ability to 
collect data, credit card issuers include terms and clauses that 
consumers do not know of or understand. 189 For example, many 
credit card issuers do not include the penalty interest rate to which a 
card can be increased, or what activities warrant a penalty.190 For 
these reasons, it is difficult for consumers to effectively price credit 
cards and thus understand a card's true costs to them. 191 Without an 
understanding of how credit products work, namely how interest rates 
are applied and what fees a card has, consumers cannot evaluate the 
true cost of credit. 192 For example, in a nationwide survey by the 
Consumer Federation of America, it was found that 63% of 
respondents did not know that the APR was the primary indicator of a 
183. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
184. Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and Preference Among 
Low-Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REv. 451, 467 (2008). 
185. W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Discounting for Regulatory Analysis, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 
209,238-39 (2007). 
186. Littwin, supra note 184, at 468. 
187. See Bar-Gill, supra note 41, at 1395-97. 
188. See Littwin, supra note 184, at 468. 
189. GAO REpORT, supra note 4, at 33-51. 
190. PEW HEALTH GRP., Two STEPS FORWARD: AFTER THE CREDIT CARD ACT, CREDIT 
CARDS ARE SAFER AND MORE TRANSPARENT - BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN 21 (2010), 
available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorglReports/ 
Credit_ CardslPEW -CreditCard%20FINAL.PDF?n= 1231. 
191. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 69, at 32. 
192. See id. at 33-34. 
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loan's cost and that 30% did not even know what the letters meant. 193 
Further, many card holders were not aware that they could exceed 
their maximum balance thereby resulting in an overage fee. 194 
Also, many consumers do not understand credit card agreements 
because of confusing and complicated language. 195 While the 
average adult in the United States reads at or below the eighth-grade 
level,196 agreements are written at the tenth- to twelfth-grade level. 197 
Additionally, not all fees that are charged by credit card issuers must 
be disclosed. 198 A failure to understand the credit agreement and the 
lack of awareness of potential fees creates an uncertainty of how 
much the credit card could cost the consumer. 199 
4. Discounting the Possibilities of Unforeseen Contingencies 
Consumers often underestimate their future borrowing because of 
optimistic views of their own futures. 2oo Credit cards, rather than 
savings, are being used as safety nets in low- and middle-income 
families. 201 Credit cards give families the impression of fmancial 
security, but, when families are encountered with an unforeseen 
contingency (e.g., losing a job, medical complication, or loss of a 
spouse), placing debt on credit cards can start a "downward financial 
spiral. ,,202 
D. The Credit CARD Act Does Not Provide Enough Protection 
While the Credit CARD Act regulations are a step in the right 
direction to protecting consumers and easing the burden of debt our 
society faces, Congress should have taken a closer look at instituting 
193. Jd. at 30-31. 
194. Many card holders thought that their card would be turned down if they attempted to 
make a purchase that exceeded their balance. See Rodriguez, supra note 121, at 309. 
195. GAO REpORT, supra note 4, at 33-36. 
196. Jd. at 6. 
197. Id. For example, the GAO found that one credit card agreement "used the term 
"rolling consecutive twelve billing cycle period' instead of saying 'over the next 12 
billing statements' or 'next 12 months. '" Id. at 46. 
198. Id. at 35. If a consumer is not aware of a fee, there is no way that fee could be 
factored into the decision to borrow on a credit card. 
199. See id. at 41-43,46. 
200. Bar-Gill, supra note 41, at 1400. 
20l. eTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, THE PLASTIC SAFETY NET: THE REALITY BEHIND 
DEBT IN AMERICA 10-11, 16 (2005), available at http://www.demos.org!pubsIPSN_ 
low.pdf. 
202. Id. at 19. 
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a national usury rate to prevent credit cards from charging a "high,,203 
rate of interest to consumers. 
While Senator Bernie Sanders (Vermont (Independent» proposed 
an amendment to the Credit CARD Act that would have established a 
national usury rate of 15%,204 the amendment was handily defeated 
with little debate.205 Despite Congress' reluctance to enact a national 
usury rate, there is ample evidence that consumers need more 
protection than what is provided in the Credit CARD Act, and a 
national usury rate would supply that protection. 206 
IV. REGULATION IN THE FORM OF A NATIONAL USURY 
RATE IS NEEDED 
As explained in Part III, "[h ]uman life is marked by fits of rational 
and irrational behavior.,,207 This irrational behavior, in addition to 
credit card issuers' practices and contracts that can be indecipherable 
to the layperson, justifies additional regulation on credit cards. The 
Credit CARD Act took a step in the right direction by curbing some 
of the industry's most egregious practices. 208 But to battle the 
consumer debt situation, Congress needs to revisit the concept of 
usury laws that were prevalent in the formation and early era of this 
country. 
In implementing usury laws, there are three logical options that 
Congress could pursue. First, Congress could amend the loophole in 
the NBA and give states the ability to regulate the interest rates being 
extended to their citizens.209 Second, a national fixed rate could be 
implemented to apply to all states.2lO Or, third, a floating rate tied to 
the prime rate could be implemented so that the maximum interest 
203. The term "high," when speaking on a rate of interest for a credit card, is relative. See 
Zywicki, supra note 154, at 99-100. However, it is hard to argue that a credit card 
with an interest rate of 79.99% is not "high." See, e.g., Chuck Jaffe, Credit-Card 
Issuers Find Creative Ways to Skirt New Law, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 21, 2010, 12:01 
AM), http://www.marketwatch.comlstory/credit-card-firms-get-crafty-in-skirting-Iaw-
2010-01-21. 
204. See 155 CONGo REc. S5351-65 (dailyed. May 12,2009) (Senator Sanders proposing 
Amendment 1062 to the Credit CARD Act to establish a national usury rate). 
205. 155 CONGo REc. S5423 (daily ed. May 13, 2009). The National Usury Rate 
amendment was defeated by a vote of 33 yeas to 60 nays. Id 
206. See supra Part III. 
207. Rougeau, supra note 81, at 40. 
208. See supra Part 1I1.A. 
209. See, e.g., supra Part II.A. 
210. See, e.g., 155 CONGo REc. S5351-65 (daily ed. May 12, 2009). 
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rate "incorporates the economic reality of the ever-changing cost of 
money in the general economy. ,,211 
A. State Regulation 
Amending the NBA so that states retake control of usury rates 
within their own borders is likely unworkable. Taking this action 
would be met with great resistance by the credit card and banking 
industry. 212 The entire industry would have to be reorganized. This 
would create many of the same problems the credit card industry 
encountered while it was in its infancy: state-by-state regulation and 
required compliance with the particular laws of each state. 213 
Additionally, the United States economy has become more 
national and "[i]n an era of interstate banking, uniform regulation of 
consumer credit products at the federal level may well be more 
efficient than a litany of consumer protection rules that vary from 
state to state.,,214 In the current marketplace, state regulation would 
create a convoluted system in an era where the United States 
economy is more national than local. 215 
B. Federal Regulation-National Fixed Usury Rate 
The second option, establishing a national usury rate, is a model 
that would provide consumers with needed protection, but it is not the 
best option. The main problem with this option is that it is not 
responsive to changing economic conditions. 216 However, if 
Congress were to go this route, the Credit Union Act provides a ready 
model that could be fo llowed. 217 National Credit Unions are subject 
to a national usury rate established by statute218 and subject to agency 
governance.219 
211. Rougeau, supra note 81, at 41. 
212. See, e.g., supra Part II. A. I. The credit card industry challenged state regulation in the 
federal courts and likely would oppose any regulation granting power back to the 
states. See, e.g., supra Part II.A.l. 
213. See supra Part II. 
214. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 69, at 83. 
215. See id. 
216. See Zwicki, supra note 154, at 150-52. 
217. Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.c. § 1751 et seq. (2006 & Supp. N 2011). It 
should be noted that credit unions are "nonprofit, cooperative financial institution[s] 
owned and run by [their] members," while credit card issuers and commercial banks 
are designed to operate in the free market and turn a profit. COST OF CREDIT, supra 
note 10, § 3.6.1, at 113. 
218. 12 U.S.c. § 1757(5)(A)(vi). 
219. Id. § 1757(5)(a)(vi)(I). 
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The Federal Credit Union Act, originally enacted in 1934, set forth 
legislation that, among other things, regulated the amount of interest 
a nationally chartered credit union could charge on a loan. 220 
Currently, credit unions are statutorily permitted to charge a 
maximum interest rate of 15%.221 However, the statute also grants 
power to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (Board) to consult 
"with the appropriate committees of the Congress" to determine 
whether the interest ceiling should be raised because of 
circumstances threatening the "safety and soundness of individual 
credit unions as evidenced by adverse trends in liquidity, capital, 
earnings, and growth.',zz2 Since May 1987, the Board has set the 
maximum interest rate at 18%.223 
While this option would provide consumers with protection from 
exorbitant interest rates, a fIxed rate would not allow credit card 
issuers to adjust interest rates when the market so requires. 224 A 
problem with this option is that a regulation board would have to be 
created to monitor economic conditions and substitute a higher rate if 
the conditions so required. 225 Issuers would not, therefore, be able to 
quickly adapt to a changing market or economic conditions. 226 
C. Federal Regulation-National Floating Interest Rate 
Establishing a national floating interest rate that is tied to the 
prime rate provides the best option for regulating credit card interest 
rates.227 Tying the maximum allowable interest rate to the prime rate 
would allow an interest rate to adjust with the issuer's cost of doing 
business, which is somewhat dependent on the prime rate. 228 
220. Federal Credit Union Act, ch. 750, 48 Stat. 1216 (1934). 
221. 12 U.S.c. § 1757(5)(A)(vi). 
222. Id. § 1757(5)(A)(vi)(D. 
223. See COST OF CREDIT, supra note 10, § 3.6.1, at 113 (citing Letter from NCUA to 
Federal Credit Unions No. 08-FCU-02 (Jan. 2008), http://www.ncua.gov/Resources/ 
Documents/LFCU2008-02. pdf). 
224. See Zwicki, supra note 154, at 150--52. 
225. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1757(5)(A)(vi)(I). 
226. See Loan Interest Rates, 71 Fed. Reg. 42, 249 (July 26, 2006) (codified at 12 C.F.R 
pt. 701); Zywicki, supra note 154, at 150--52. 
227. ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE Two INCOME TRAP: WHY 
MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 145 (2003). 
228. Credit card issuers have three main costs in running their business: marketing costs, 
collection costs, and the cost to borrow money that is eventually relent to consumers. 
Id. at 148. Credit card lenders borrow from the Federal Reserve at the prime rate. See 
id. Credit card issuers then relend that money they have borrowed to consumers. Id 
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Additionally, the prime rate is a benchmark rate and is used in other 
lending activities. 229 
By tying the maximum usury rate to an index, issuers will not 
suffer when economic conditions worsen and their costs of obtaining 
money rises.230 Likewise, when issuers' costs to obtain money drops 
but the interest rate charged to a consumer does not correspondingly 
drop, issuers will not receive a windfalL 231 A majority of credit card 
issuers' profits come from interest charged on accounts.232 Issuers 
profit when they loan money at a higher rate than what they obtain it 
for.233 Tying a maximum interest rate to the prime rate would ensure 
that an issuer's cost of doing business-extending credit-did not fall 
below its cost of operations--obtaining money.234 More importantly, 
if consumers are aware that their costs of borrowing on credit are tied 
to the prime rate, they could judge the costs of borrowing--or at least 
have a baseline pricing point-more effectively. 235 
To effectively carry out this policy, fees and all other charges must 
be included in the defmition and calculation of interest.236 Without 
calculating fees within the defmition of interest, credit card issuers 
could circumvent an interest cap by creating and charging consumers 
new fees.237 Including all fees within the defmition of interest would 
also help consumers more effectively price the cost of credit. The 
ace has already defmed certain fees as interest.238 By including fees 
in the calculation of interest, consumers could better assess the cost 
229. See, e.g., 15 U.S.c. § 1639c(a)(6)(D)(ii) (2006 & Supp. N 2011) (tying the standards 
for a home mortgage loan to the prime rate). 
230. See WARREN & TYAGl, supra note 227, at 148. 
231. Jd. Professor Warren explains just how significant an issuer's windfall can be by 
using the happenings of 2001, when the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates nine 
times during the course of the year. Jd. While the Federal Reserve lowered interest 
rates, credit card issuers did not return the favor to their consumers. Jd. The issuers 
did not change their business strategy: marketing and collection costs stayed the same 
and their credit products stayed the same. Jd. at 148--49. Profits rose $10 billion. Jd. 
at 149. Card holders received no benefits from the Federal Reserve's lowering of the 
interest rate; all holders did was transfer $10 billion in net worth to card issuers. Jd. 
232. GAO REpORT, supra note 4, at 67. Approximately 70% of credit card revenue comes 
from interest rates. Jd. However, what is not clear is whether certain fees, which the 
OCC defined as interest in Smiley, are included in that calculation. See id. at 68-71. 
233. See id. at 96-98, 104. 
234. See WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 227, at 148. 
235. This premise is based on the assumption that credit card consumers would be aware of 
the prime rate and that the maximum interest rate is tied to the prime rate. See id. 
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of credit card borrowing. 239 This would minimize the imperfect 
information problem because no matter how complicated a credit 
card agreement is, consumers would know that all potential fees 
would be included in the calculation of interest. 240 
Many of those against the regulation of interest rates adhere to the 
free market principle. 241 They believe that people should have the 
free choice to obtain credit cards and that paternalistic regulation is 
against the American economic system/42 that the credit card market 
is competitive and it will correct itself;243 that consumers act 
rationally and regulation would impinge on their choice;244 and that a 
deregulated market provides for lower costs and more choices of 
credit products?45 However, these arguments assume the existence of 
a well-functioning credit card marketplace. 246 In an efficient market 
with rational consumers, regulation would be harmful. 247 
The problem with that argument is that credit card consumers have 
demonstrated irrational behavior when using credit card products. 248 
The free-market detractors' argument against a national usury law is 
misplaced because of consumers' irrational behavior. 249 Because of 
the sheer volume of transactions that credit card issuers track, they 
likely know that consumers do not act rationally.250 Issuers know that 
consumers can be exploited-because of either their irrational 
behavior or imperfect information on the credit products being 
offered-and the issuers create credit products to exploit the 
consumers.251 
Implementing a floating usury rate would force credit card issuers 
to reevaluate their lending practices.252 Overaggressive lenders 
would not be able to rely on the litany of fees and high interest rates 
239. See WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 227, at 145,148. 
240. See supra Part III.e.3. 
241. See DeMuth, supra note 43, at 242. 
242. Zwicki, supra note 154, at 94. 
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BANKR.lNST.1. REv. 511,544 (2008). 
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248. See supra Part III.e. 
249. See supra Part III.e. 
250. See supra Part lILe. 
251. See supra Part 1II.e. 
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to make a pro fit. 253 Credit card issuers' current lending practices 
operate in a manner where the issuers know that some consumers will 
not be able to repay their loans, so a higher interest rate is charged to 
all card holders. 254 Issuers would have to more closely scrutinize 
whom they extended credit card products to and the amount of credit 
extended. 255 Because issuers would not be able to charge a "high" 
interest rate to individuals with marginal credit records, it would 
become unprofitable to extend credit to those in fmancial trouble. 256 
When extending credit, issuers would not be able to rely on high 
interest rates as a safety net for bad loans and would have a greater 
incentive to determine what the card holders could actually repay. 257 
While a maximum interest rate would likely reduce the access 
consumers have to credit/58 "that is not necessarily a negative 
development.,,259 Consumers have been active participants in the 
credit card market, and their lack of self-control is a reason for the 
consumer debt burden.260 However, a primary reason for the Credit 
CARD Act was to address the billions in outstanding consumer 
debt.261 This increase in consumer debt coincided with the expansion 
of credit cards being offered and used. 262 Consumers have been 
receiving extensions of credit that they simply cannot afford. 263 A 
national floating usury rate would limit the amount of total credit 
being extended to consumers, and consumers' lack of self-control 
would be minimized because credit lines would not be great. 264 
Consumers would not be able to run up as much debt on credit cards 
if lenders must scrutinize the amount of credit being extended and 
consumers have lower limits.265 
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v. CONCLUSION 
While the Credit CARD Act implemented some consumer 
protections that should benefit credit card users, to effectively carry 
out the policy, a national usury rate needs to be enacted. Consumers 
have demonstrated that they act irrationally when using credit 
cards. 266 Their irrational behavior has been exploited by credit card 
issuers, which has led to a dramatic increase of consumer debt over 
the last twenty-five years. 267 A national usury rate tied to the prime 
rate would provide consumers with much needed protection. 
Consumers would be able to better price the cost of credit, and 
issuers would have to engage in more prudent lending. 
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